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The	possibility	of	irreconcilable	epistemic	conflicts	between	accepted	scientific	approaches	and	certain	alternative	stances,	such	as	creationism,	is	the	topic	of	yet	another	pluralist	discussion:	the	one	about	the	role	and	legitimacy	of	dissent	and	the	limits	related	to	uptake	of	criticism.	This	can	also	be	seen	as	giving	rise	to	what	we	identify	as	a	pluralistic	version	of	the	demarcation	problem.	The	question	is	whether	there	are	criteria	that	would	allow	an	advocate	of	a	pluralist	stance	to	rule	out	creationism	and	climate	change	denialism	(and	the	like)	as	not	being	of	the	right	kind	of	dissent	that	should	be	taken	into	account	in	objective	scientific	research.	Many	pluralists	value	dissent,	as	it	may	promote	creativity	and	the	detection	of	errors	and	may	thereby	lead	to	the	improvement	of	scientific	theories.	However,	some	forms	of	dissent	may	be	harmful,	and	even	if	scientists	have	an	obligation	to	engage	dissenting	views,	this	obligation	should	not	extend	to	just	any	dissent	(Longino	1993,	Longino	2002,	Solomon	2008,	Kitcher	2011,	Melo-Martin	and	Intermann	2014,	Biddle	and	Leuchner	2015).	In	this	discussion	the	following	setting	is	usually	assumed	(Table	4).		Participants	 There	are	two	relevant	groups:	the	mainstream	scientific	researchers	and	the	dissenters.	Status	as	producers	of	knowledge	 The	researchers	as	well	as	the	dissenters	have	at	least	to	some	degree	socially	established	roles	and	an	institutional	status	as	producers	of	knowledge.	Power	asymmetries	 There	is	no	consistent	power	asymmetry	across	situations;	the	dissenters	may	in	some	cases	be	in	social	or	financial	positions	of	power	in	relation	to	the	mainstream	researchers,	while	in	some	other	cases	the	situation	may	be	the	opposite.	Epistemic	conflict	 There	is	a	serious,	perhaps	irreconcilable	epistemic	conflict	between	the	two	groups.	Value	conflict	 The	epistemic	conflict	typically	reflects	an	important	conflict	of	values.	Table	4	–	Setting	assumed	in	pluralist	PoS	when	discussing	problematic	dissent		One	response	to	the	pluralistic	demarcation	problem	is	to	refer	to	interactive	accounts	of	objectivity	that	stress	the	qualities	of	epistemic	communities	(see	Douglas	2007).	For	instance,	Longino	(1990,	2002)	has	formulated	norms	or	criteria	according	to	which	the	objectivity	of	research	communities	can	be	evaluated,	and	she	uses	them	to	delimit	scientists'	obligations	towards	dissenters	such	as	creationists.	The	criteria	include	(1)	the	existence	of	venues	for	effective	criticism,	such	as	journals	and	conferences;	(2)	uptake	of	criticism:	"beliefs	and	theories	must	change	over	time	in	response	to	the	critical	discourse	taking	place"	(Longino	2002,	129);	(3)	publicly	recognized	standards	of	
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evaluation	of	observations	and	theories;	and	the	already	mentioned	(4)	tempered	equality	of	epistemic	authority:	"the	social	position	or	economic	power	of	an	individual	or	group	in	a	community	ought	not	to	determine	who	or	what	perspectives	are	taken	seriously	in	that	community"	(ibid.,	131).	If	the	dissenters	themselves	do	not	strive	to	meet	these	criteria	–	if	they	for	example	do	not	take	outside	criticism	into	account	–	researchers	are	not	obliged	to	use	their	time	for	what	appear	to	be	clearly	fruitless	debates	with	them.	Let	us	now	consider	an	example:	a	conference	organised	by	the	Southern	Interior	Forest	Extension	and	Research	Partnership	and	En'owkin	Centre	(taking	place	in	Quaaout	Lodge	on	the	Little	Shuswap	Reserve,	near	Chase,	British	Columbia,	in	March	2001),	devoted	to	examining	the	possibilities	of	linking	indigenous	knowledge	with	scientific	knowledge	in	natural	resource	management	(Michel	&	Gayton	2002).	The	aim	of	the	conference	was	to	recognize	indigenous	knowledge	"as	a	knowledge	system	of	equal	importance	to	western	science",	and	to	incorporate	it	into	ecosystem-based	natural	resource	management	(Michel	2002,	4).	The	participants	included	"indigenous	knowledge	keepers,	scientists,	resource	managers,	elders	and	academics"	(Michel	&	Gayton	2002,	iv).	The	conference	proceedings	make	it	clear	that	there	were	strong	tensions	between	the	participant	groups.	Not	all	believed	the	integrative	goals	to	be	achievable,	mainly	because	of	differences	between	scientific	and	indigenous	knowledge	systems,	and	because	of	power	imbalances	between	scientists,	academics	and	the	resource	managers	on	one	side,	and	the	indigenous	knowledge	keepers	and	elders	on	the	other.	Several	indigenous	participants	feared	it	would	lead	to	all	too	familiar	epistemic	injustices.	A	participant	expressed	the	worry	appositely:	"If	there	is	a	gap,	and	the	two	systems	are	fundamentally	different,	then	you	can't	link	them.	Or	if	you	did,	it	would	be	one-sided,	with	Western	science	calling	the	shots"	(Michel	&	Gayton	2002,	54).	However,	the	organisers	were	keen	on	achieving	their	goals.	This	led	to	potentially	problematic	outcomes.	The	president	of	the	conference	describes	the	practices	developed	when	planning	the	conference	in	the	following	way:	Gaining	the	blessing	of	the	Elders	and	the	permission	of	the	spirits	of	the	land	tells	me	that	we	are	heading	in	the	right	direction.	Imagine	how	this	conference	would	have	turned	out	if	we	did	not	follow	these	protocols.	We	would	probably	have	made	some	horrendous	mistakes.	(Michel	2002,	5.)	It	is	not	unheard	of	in	indigenous	communities	that	epistemic	authority	depends	on	the	speaker's	age,	or	the	person’s	status	as	an	elder.	This	is	of	course	inconsistent	with	Longino's	(2002)	criterion	of	tempered	equality:	the	epistemic	authority	of	the	elders	is	determined	by	their	social	position.	Nevertheless,	the	president	of	the	conference	adopted	this	social-epistemic	practice.	
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It	may	well	be	that	this	example	proves	to	be	unproblematic.	Michel's	words	can	be	interpreted	as	a	courtesy	rather	than	an	epistemological	statement.	It	is	also	possible	that	such	problematic	principles	are	flexible	and	negotiable	–	that	the	indigenous	communities	in	question	would,	in	the	end,	be	prepared	to	renounce	them	in	the	context	of	a	research	project.	However,	if	the	epistemically	privileged	status	of	the	elders5	happens	to	be	something	the	indigenous	epistemic	communities	in	question	will	never	give	up	in	relevant	situations,	then	it	can	prove	difficult	to	integrate	the	knowledge	systems	in	a	way	that	would	both	satisfy	the	indigenous	participants	and	meet	the	criteria	formulated	by	Longino.	Moreover,	there	are	other	cases	in	which	similar	issues	are	at	stake.	For	example,	according	to	Linda	Tuhiwai	Smith,	"Maori	society	valued	knowledge	highly,	to	such	an	extent	that	certain	types	of	knowledge	were	entrusted	only	to	a	few	members	of	the	whanau"	(Smith	1999,	172).	If	this	kind	of	secrecy	is	indeed	an	essential	part	of	the	Maori	knowledge	system,	and	if	it	has	to	be	preserved	in	situations	when	Maori	knowledge	is	to	be	integrated	with	academic	knowledge,	the	social-epistemic	practices	of	the	resulting	epistemic	community	are	not	likely	to	meet	Longino's	criteria.	It	is	in	the	nature	of	a	secret	that	it	cannot	meet	with	effective	outside	criticism.	In	other	words,	the	attempted	integration	would	result	in	threatening	the	objectivity	of	the	research	community.	Now	we	know	that	in	actual	scientific	practice	information	disclosure	is	not	perfect,	and	we	know	that	epistemic	authority	is	not	evenly	distributed.	Yet	we	agree	with	Longino	in	that	perfect	information	disclosure	is	an	ideal	to	be	pursued	and	that	epistemic	authority	is	to	be	based	on	prior	scientific	achievements	and	not	to	be	accepted	on	epistemically	irrelevant	grounds.	Therefore,	if	an	extra-academic	knowledge	system	includes	generally	approved	practices	such	as	determining	epistemic	authority	according	to	the	speaker’s	age,	or	concealing	certain	types	of	knowledge	because	of	their	spiritual	(or,	say,	commercial)	value,	and	if	these	practices	are	inseparable	parts	of	wholistic	epistemic	systems	–	then	it	is	unfeasible	to	integrate	these	systems	with	academic	knowledge.		
5.	Conclusion:	What	extra-academic	transdisciplinarity	and	scientific	
pluralism	might	learn	from	one	another?	
																																																								5	As	to	how	significant	a	problem	"gaining	the	permission	of	the	spirits	of	the	land"	is,	depends	on	what	exactly	it	amounts	to.	If	it	is	for	instance	comparable	to	prayer,	and	participation	is	optional,	it	might	not	jeoprdise	the	objectivity	of	the	research	community.	On	the	other	hand,	if	there	are	specific	people	in	the	community	who	have	the	power	to	determine	whether	the	permission	of	the	spirits	has	been	achieved	or	not,	it	is	inconsistent	whith	the	criterion	of	tempered	equality	(Longino	2002).	
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The	non-philosophical	literature	on	TD	appears	to	be	overly	optimistic.	We	have	argued	that	several	ideas	developed	within	pluralist	philosophies	of	science	have	the	potential	of	being	of	use	when	analysing	problems	and	challenges	presently	passed	over	in	this	over-optimistic	literature.	Attempts	to	integrate	diverse	knowledge	systems	often	fail,	and	they	may	fail	in	a	variety	of	ways.	Sometimes	problems	in	integration	can	be	solved	through	mutual	learning	and	deliberation,	if	given	enough	time,	but	this	is	not	at	all	always	so.	This	may	be	because	scientific	knowledge	systems	are	theoretically	incompatible,	at	least	presently.	The	integration	of	academic	knowledge	systems	with	extra-academic	knowledge	systems	can	fail	if	the	respective	epistemic	communities	have	inflexible	conflicting	epistemic	values	and	norms	that	may	be	embedded	in	social-epistemic	practices.	The	strong	pressure	on	TD	projects	to	rapidly	generate	integration	may	result	in	pseudo-integration	and	thereby	jeopardise	the	reliability	of	the	outputs	of	such	projects.	Moreover,	the	absence	of	operational	peer	communities	and	agreed-upon	standards	for	evaluation	makes	the	detection	of	such	shortcomings	difficult.	The	notion	of	knowledge	systems	used	in	the	TD	literature	resembles	the	anthropological	notion	developed	for	purposes	in	relation	to	which	normative	epistemic	assessment	is	generally	avoided.	In	discussions	on	extra-academic	TD	the	concept	is	however	used	in	contexts	where	normative	epistemic	assessment	is	indispensable	and	the	epistemic	norms	and	values	of	the	different	epistemic	communities	may	be	found	to	conflict	with	each	other.	If	knowledge	systems	are	to	be	integrated,	they	must	be	critically	assessed.	Combined	with	the	optimistic	idea	that	integration	is	to	happen	through	mutual	learning	and	deliberation,	this	notion	of	knowledge	systems	may	result	in	decreased	objectivity	of	research	communities.	More	interaction	between	the	two	broad	bodies	of	literature	would	be	welcome.	This	could	prove	useful	for	the	development	of	socially	inclusive	research	practices,	and	for	the	ongoing	discussions	of	the	roles	that	local	communities,	businesses,	NGOs,	indigenous	people	and	others	might	play	in	scientific	research.	We	suggest	that	pluralist	philosophers	of	science	sympathetic	to	some	of	the	aims	of	TD	would	look	more	closely	at	actual	TD	research	and	the	complex	settings	in	which	extra-academic	collaboration	and	participation	happen.	It	is	important	for	progress	in	(our	assessment	of)	extra-academic	TD	that	it	receives	philosophical	attention	that	recognises	what	is	valuable	in	it,	and	that	is	capable	of	offering	constructive	criticism.	The	pluralist	reasoning	about	extra-academic	participation	could	do	more	than	just	concentrate	on	arguing	why	it	is	important	to	give	extra-academic	agents	a	role	in	academic	research.	It	is	equally	important	to	ask	how	to	do	it	well.		
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